# Safety Manual

## **VEGACAP** series 60

Two-wire





Document ID: 31813







## Contents

1	Fund	tional safety	. 3
	1.1	General information	. 3
	1.2	Planning	. 4
	1.3	Adjustment instructions	. 6
	1.4	Setup	. 6
	1.5	Reaction during operation and in case of failure	. 6
		Recurring function test	
	1.7	Safety-related characteristics	. 7
2	Sup	plement	10



Scope

## 1 Functional safety

### 1.1 General information

This safety manual applies to measuring systems consisting of the capacitive level switch VEGACAP series 60 with integrated electronics module CP60Z:

#### VEGACAP 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69

Valid hardware and software versions:

- Serial number of the electronics > 14678431
- Sensor software from Rev. 1.01

Application area The measuring system can be implemented for level detection of liquids and solids which meet the specific requirements of safety technology.

Due to the systematic capability SC3 this is possible up to:

- SIL2 in single-channel architecture
- SIL3 in multiple channel architecture



The use of the measuring system with a mounted float for safetyrelevant oil/water detection is not permitted.

SIL conformity

Abbreviations, terms

The SIL conformity is confirmed by the verification documents in the appendix.

SIL	Safety Integrity Level
HFT	Hardware Fault Tolerance
SFF	Safe Failure Fraction
	Average Probability of dangerous Failure on Demand
PFH	Probability of a dangerous Failure per Hour
FMEDA	Failure Mode, Effects and Diagnostics Analysis
$\lambda_{sd}$	Rate for safe detected failure
	Rate for safe undetected failure
	Rate for dangerous detected failure
$\lambda_{du}$	Rate for dangerous undetected failure
DCs	Diagnostic Coverage of safe failures; $\text{DC}_{\text{S}}$ = $\lambda_{\text{sd}}/(\lambda_{\text{sd}}+\lambda_{\text{su}})$
DC	Diagnostic Coverage of dangerous failures; $DC_{D} = \lambda_{dd}/(\lambda_{dd} + \lambda_{du})$
FIT	Failure In Time (1 FIT = 1 failure/10 <sup>9</sup> h)
MTBF	Mean Time Between Failure
MTTF	Mean Time To Failure
MTTR	Mean Time To Repair
$\frac{avg}{PFH}$ FMEDA $\frac{\lambda_{sd}}{\lambda_{su}}$ $\frac{\lambda_{dd}}{\lambda_{du}}$ DC <sub>S</sub> DC <sub>D</sub> FIT MTBF MTTF	Probability of a dangerous Failure per Hour Failure Mode, Effects and Diagnostics Analysis Rate for safe detected failure Rate for safe undetected failure Rate for dangerous detected failure Rate for dangerous undetected failure Diagnostic Coverage of safe failures; $DC_s = \lambda_{sd}/(\lambda_{sd} + \lambda_{su})$ Diagnostic Coverage of dangerous failures; $DC_p = \lambda_{dd}/(\lambda_{dd} + \lambda_{du})$ Failure In Time (1 FIT = 1 failure/10 <sup>9</sup> h) Mean Time Between Failure

Further abbreviations and terms are stated in IEC 61508-4.

**Relevant standards** 

IEC 61508 (also available as DIN EN)

31813-EN-181129



 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems

#### Safety requirements

Failure limit values for a safety function, depending on the SIL class (of IEC 61508-1, 7.6.2)

Safety integrity level	Low demand mode	High demand mode
SIL	PFD <sub>avg</sub>	PFH
4	≥ 10 <sup>-5</sup> < 10 <sup>-4</sup>	≥ 10 <sup>-9</sup> < 10 <sup>-8</sup>
3	≥ 10 <sup>-4</sup> < 10 <sup>-3</sup>	≥ 10 <sup>-8</sup> < 10 <sup>-7</sup>
2	≥ 10 <sup>.3</sup> < 10 <sup>.2</sup>	≥ 10 <sup>-7</sup> < 10 <sup>-6</sup>
1	≥ 10 <sup>-2</sup> < 10 <sup>-1</sup>	≥ 10 <sup>-6</sup> < 10 <sup>-5</sup>

Safety integrity of hardware for safety-related subsystems of type B (IEC 61508-2, 7.4.3)

Safe failure fraction	Hardware fault tolerance		
SFF	HFT = 0	HFT = 1	HFT = 2
< 60 %	not permit- ted	SIL1	SIL2
60 % < 90 %	SIL1	SIL2	SIL3
90 % < 99 %	SIL2	SIL3	(SIL4)
≥ 99 %	SIL3	(SIL4)	(SIL4)

#### Safety function

Safe state

### 1.2 Planning

The measuring system generates on the current output a signal between 3.8 mA and 20.5 mA corresponding to the level.

This analogue signal is transmitted to a connected processing unit to monitor the following conditions:

- Exceeding a preset level
- Falling below a preset level

When the switching point set on the processing unit is reached, a signal is output.

#### The safe state depends on the mode:

	Overflow protection (max. operation)	Dry run protection (min. operation)
Safe state	Exceeding the switch- ing point	Falling below the switch- ing point
Output current in safe state	> Switching point (-3 %)	< Switching point (+3 %)
Failure current "fail low"	< 2.3 mA	< 2.3 mA
Failure current "fail high"	> 23.5 mA	> 23.5 mA

The current tolerance  $\pm 3$  % refers to the full measuring range of 16 mA.



Fault description	A safe failure exists when the measuring system switches to the de- fined safe state or the fault mode without the process demanding it.
	If the internal diagnostic system detects a failure, the measuring system goes into fault mode.
	A dangerous undetected failure exists if the measuring system switches neither to the defined safe state nor to the failure mode when the process requires it.
Configuration of the pro- cessing unit	If the measuring system delivers output currents of " <i>fail low</i> " or " <i>fail high</i> ", it can be assumed that there is a malfunction.
	The processing unit must therefore interpret such currents as a mal- function and output a suitable fault signal.
	If this is not the case, the corresponding portions of the failure rates must be assigned to the dangerous failures. The stated values in chapter " <i>Safety-relevant characteristics</i> " can thus worsen.
	The processing unit must correspond to the SIL level of the measurement chain.
Low demand mode	If the demand rate is only once a year, then the measuring system can be used as safety-relevant subsystem in " <i>low demand mode</i> " (IEC 61508-4, 3.5.12).
	If the ratio of the internal diagnostics test rate of the measuring sys- tem to the demand rate exceeds the value 100, the measuring system can be treated as if it is executing a safety function in the mode with low demand rate (IEC 61508-2, 7.4.3.2.5).
	An associated characteristic is the value $PFD_{avg}$ (average Probability of dangerous Failure on Demand). It is dependent on the test interval $T_{Proof}$ between the function tests of the protective function.
	Number values see chapter "Safety-related characteristics".
High demand mode	If the " <i>low demand rate</i> " does not apply, the measuring system should be used as a safety-relevant subsystem in the mode " <i>high demand mode</i> " (IEC 61508-4, 3.5.12).
	The fault tolerance time of the complete system must be higher than the sum of the reaction times or the diagnostics test periods of all components in the safety-related measurement chain.
	An associated characteristic is the value PFH (failure rate).
	Number values see chapter "Safety-related characteristics".
Assumptions	The following assumptions form the basis for the implementation of FMEDA:
	• Failure rates are constant, wear of the mechanical parts is not
	<ul> <li>Failure rates of external power supplies are not taken into account</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Multiple errors are not taken into account</li> <li>The average ambient temperature during the operating time is</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>The average ambient temperature during the operating time is 40 °C (104 °F)</li> </ul>
	The environmental conditions correspond to an average industrial environment



	• The lifetime of the components is around 8 to 12 years (IEC 61508-2, 7.4.7.4, remark 3)
	<ul> <li>The repair time (exchange of the measuring system) after an non-</li> </ul>
	dangerous malfunction is eight hours (MTTR = 8 h)
	<ul> <li>The processing unit can interpret "fail low" and "fail high" failures as a disruption and trigger a suitable error message</li> </ul>
	• The scanning interval of a connected control and processing unit
	<ul> <li>is max. 1 hour, in order to react to dangerous, detectable errors</li> <li>Existing communication interfaces (e. g. HART, I<sup>2</sup>C-Bus) are not</li> </ul>
	used for transmission of safety-relevant information
General instructions and restrictions	The measuring system should be used appropriately taking pressure, temperature, density, dielectric value and chemical properties of the medium into account.
	The user-specific limits must be complied with. The specifications of the operating instructions manual must not be exceeded.
	Keep in mind when using as dry run protection:
	• Avoid rod or cable breakage (probably smaller proof test intervals will be necessary)
	1.3 Adjustment instructions
Adjustment elements	Since the plant conditions influence the safety of the measuring system, the adjustment elements must be set according to the application:
	DIL switch for measuring range selection
	The function of the adjustment elements is described in the operating instructions manual.
	1.4 Setup
Mounting and installation	Take note of the mounting and installation instructions in the operating instructions manual.
	In the setup procedure, a check of the safety function by means of an initial filling is recommended.
	1.5 Reaction during operation and in case of failure
Operation and interfer- ence	The adjustment elements or device parameters must not be modified during operation.
	If modifications have to be made during operation, carefully observe the safety functions.
	Fault signals that may appear are described in the appropriate operat- ing instructions manual.
	If faults or error messages are detected, the entire measuring system must be shut down and the process held in a safe state by other measures.



The exchange of the electronics is simple and described in the operating instructions manual. Note the instructions for parameter adjustment and setup.

If due to a detected failure the electronics or the complete sensor is exchanged, the manufacturer must be informed (incl. a fault description).

#### 1.6 **Recurring function test**

Reason The recurring function test is testing the safety function and to find out possible undetected, dangerous failuress. The functional capability of the measuring system has to be tested in adequate time intervals. It is up to the user's responsibility to selct the kind of testing. The time intervals are subject to the  $PFD_{ava}$ -value according to the chart and diagram in section "Safety-relevant characteristics". With high demand rate, a recurring function test is not requested in IEC 61508. The functional efficiency of the measuring system is demonstrated by the frequent use of the system. In double channel architectures it is a good idea to verify the effect of the redundancy through recurring function tests at appropriate intervals. Implementation Please carry out the test in such a way, that the correct safety function in combination with all components is granted. This is granted by the control of the response height during a filling process. If a filling up to the response height is not practicable, the measuring system has to be responded by an appropriate simulation of the level or the physical measuring effect. The methods and procedures used during the tests must be stated and their suitability must be specified. The tests must be documented. If the function test proves negative, the entire measuring system must be switched out of service and the process held in a safe state by means of other measures. In a multiple channel architecture this applies separately to each channel. 1.7 Safety-related characteristics Basics The failure rates of the electronics, the mechanical parts of the transmitter as well as the process fitting are determined by an FMEDA according to IEC 61508. The calculations are based on component failure rates according to SN 29500. All values refer to an average ambient temperature during the operating time of 40 °C (104 °F). For a higher average temperature of 60 °C (140 °F), the failure rates should be multiplied by a factor of 2.5. A similar factor applies if freguent temperature fluctuations are expected. The calculations are also based on the specifications stated in chapter "Planning". Service life After 8 to 12 years, the failure rates of the electronic components will increase, whereby the derived PFD and PFH values will deteriorate (IEC 61508-2, 7.4.7.4, note 3).

#### Failure rates

	Overflow protection (max. operation)	Dry run protection (min. operation)
$\lambda_{sd}$	38 FIT	69 FIT
λ <sub>su</sub>	245 FIT	241 FIT
λ <sub>dd</sub>	130 FIT	98 FIT
λ <sub>du</sub>	35 FIT	40 FIT
DCs	13 %	22 %
DC <sub>D</sub>	78 %	71 %
MTBF = MTTF + MTTR	1.97 x 10 <sup>6</sup> h	1.97 x 10 <sup>6</sup> h

#### Fault reaction time

Diagnosis test period < 360 sek.	
----------------------------------	--

#### Single channel architecture

#### **Specific characteristics**

SIL	SIL2
HFT	0
Instrument type	Туре В

	Overflow protection (max. operation)	Dry run protection (min. operation)
SFF	92 %	91 %
PFD <sub>avg</sub>		
T <sub>Proof</sub> = 1 year	< 0.016 x 10 <sup>-2</sup>	< 0.018 x 10 <sup>-2</sup>
T <sub>Proof</sub> = 5 years	< 0.078 x 10 <sup>-2</sup>	< 0.088 x 10 <sup>-2</sup>
T <sub>Proof</sub> = 10 years	< 0.155 x 10 <sup>-2</sup>	< 0.177 x 10 <sup>-2</sup>
PFH	< 0.035 x 10 <sup>-6</sup> /h	< 0.04 x 10 <sup>-6</sup> /h

Time-dependent process of  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{PFD}}_{\ensuremath{\mathsf{avg}}}$ 

The chronological sequence of  $\mathsf{PFD}_{avg}$  is nearly linear to the operating time over a period up to 10 years. The above values apply only to the  $\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{Proof}}$  interval after which a recurring function test must be carried out.






Fig. 1: Chronological sequence of PFD<sub>avg</sub> (figures see above charts)

- 1  $PFD_{avg} = 0$ 2  $PFD_{avg}$  after 1 year 3  $PFD_{avg}$  after 5 years 4  $PFD_{avg}$  after 10 years

#### Multiple channel architecture

#### **Specific characteristics**

If the measuring system is used in a multiple channel architecture, the safety-relevant characteristics of the selected structure of the meas. chain must be calculated specifically for the selected application according to the above failure rates.

A suitable Common Cause Factor must be taken into account.



## 2 Supplement



# Certificate / Certificat

# Zertifikat / 合格証

VEGA 100981C P0011 C002

exida hereby confirms that the:

VEGACAP 60 Level Switch Output R,T, Z

> VEGA Grieshaber KG Schiltach - Germany

Has been assessed per the relevant requirements of:

IEC 61508 : 2000 Parts 1-7 and meets requirements providing a level of integrity to:

## Systematic Capability: SC 3 (SIL 3 Capable)

### Random Capability: Type B Element

SIL 2 @ HFT = 0; SIL 3 @ HFT = 1; Route 1<sub>H</sub> PFD<sub>AVG</sub> and Architecture Constraints must be verified for each application

#### Safety Function:

The VEGACAP 60 will de-energize its output (R & T) or set current (Z) to fail-safe output when the level goes above (or below) the trip point within the stated safety accuracy.

Application Restrictions:

The unit must be properly designed into a Safety Instrumented Function per the Safety Manual requirements.

dal

**Evaluating Assessor** 

1

**Certifying Assessor** 

Page 1 of 2



VEGACAP 60 Level Switch



T-002, V3R8

## Certificate / Certificat / Zertifikat / **合格証** VEGA 100981C P0011 C002 Systematic Capability: SC 3 (SIL 3 Capable) Random Capability: Type B Element SIL 2 @ HFT = 0; SIL 3 @ HFT = 1; Route 1<sub>H</sub> PFD<sub>AVG</sub> and Architecture Constraints must be verified for each application

Systematic Capability:

The Product has met manufacturer design process requirements of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 3. These are intended to achieve sufficient integrity against systematic errors of design by the manufacturer.

A Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) designed with this product must not be used at a SIL level higher than stated.

#### Random Capability:

The SIL limit imposed by the Architectural Constraints must be met for each element.

#### Versions:

	Туре	Application	Electronics
V1.1	VEGACAP 60 R	MIN detection	SB1221 SB1226
V1.2	VEGACAP 60 R	MAX detection	SB1236 SB1237
V2.1	VEGACAP 60 T	MIN detection	SB1223 SB1226
V2.2	VEGACAP 60 T	MAX detection	SB1236 SB1237
V3.1	VEGACAP 60 Z	MIN detection	SB1235 SB1226
V3.2	VEGACAP 60 Z	MAX detection	SB1236 SB1237

Model	Fail-Safe state	$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{\text{SU}}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{\text{DU}}$
R Max / High trip	Out De-energized	0	438	116	54
R Min / Low trip	Out De-energized	0	440	116	52
T Max / High trip	Out De-energized	0	395	115	35
T Min / Low trip	Out De-energized	0	397	115	33
Z Max / High trip	Out > 13 mA	38	245	130	35
Z Min / Low trip	Out < 11 mA	69	241	98	40

All failure rates are given in FIT (failures / 10<sup>9</sup> hours)

SIL Verification:

The Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of an entire Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) must be verified via a calculation of PFD<sub>AVG</sub> considering redundant architectures, proof test interval, proof test effectiveness, any automatic diagnostics, average repair time and the specific failure rates of all products included in the SIF. Each element must be checked to assure compliance with minimum hardware fault tolerance (HFT) requirements.

The following documents are a mandatory part of certification:

Assessment Report: VEGA 05/05-36 R013 V1R3

Safety Manuals: VEGACAP 60: R: 31814 T: 31815 Z: 31813

Page 2 of 2

Printing date:



All statements concerning scope of delivery, application, practical use and operating conditions of the sensors and processing systems correspond to the information available at the time of printing.

Subject to change without prior notice

© VEGA Grieshaber KG, Schiltach/Germany 2018

CE

VEGA Grieshaber KG Am Hohenstein 113 77761 Schiltach Germany Phone +49 7836 50-0 Fax +49 7836 50-201 E-mail: info.de@vega.com www.vega.com